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Abstract
Children’s educational aspirations are important predictors of educational attain-
ment and of occupational success. However, aspirations can be affected by whether an
individual is poor or rich. This paper evaluates the impacts of the Ethiopia’s Produc-
tive Safety Net Program (PSNP), launched by the government of Ethiopia in 2005/06
to support food insecure rural households, on children’s educational aspirations. Using
a longitudinal data from the Young Lives’ survey in Ethiopia and applying a differences-
in-differences methodology, we find that the program increases educational aspirations
of children. In our preferred specification, the immediate effect of the program is to
increase by 0.73 years of education aspirations of children. Furthermore, we find that
aspirations are affected also in the long run, even if the point estimates are sensible to
model specification. The results point to broad and long lasting positive effects of a
program designed to relieve chronically poor households from food insecurity.
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1. Introduction
Genicot and Ray (2017) define aspirations as income or wealth reference points individuals
aim to. Aspirations are important for decision making. Children’s aspirations especially may
shape their labour market outcomes, and may have long-term consequences on their later life.
In particular, educational aspirations are important predictors of educational attainment and
occupational success (Sewell et al. 1970). Using UK longitudinal data, Schoon and Parsons
(2002) find that teenage aspirations play a major role in the occupational development
of the youth and in mediating social background factors. Favara (2017) documents the
relationships of early aspirations with years of schooling completed in Ethiopia. From a
randomized control trial conducted in Uganda, Riley (2017) finds aspirations affect exam
results of students in secondary school. Moreover, Serneels and Dercon (2014) document
that aspirations raise educational attainment in India. However, aspirations can be affected
by whether an individual is poor or rich. Dalton et al. (2016) show that though both the rich
and the poor face the same behavioral bias (internal constraints such as myopia or lack of
willpower), poverty may exacerbate the behavioral bias and may lead to aspirations failure
and to behavioral poverty trap. They argue that poverty is the main cause for aspirations
failure in developing countries and point out that raising aspirations can break the trap. Ray
(2006) states that poverty stifles individual aspirations and may cause aspirations failure
which in turn lead to a self sustaining poverty trap. Moreover, Duflo (2006) also argues
that poverty affects the way people think and make decisions. Due to the prevalence of
chronic poverty, children in developing countries mostly fail to aspire for higher educational
attainment; they simply focus on quick fix solutions and forget the bigger picture. Thus,
in this paper we investigate whether the introduction of anti-poverty programs such as a
safety-net program influences children’s educational aspirations in Ethiopia.
Households in developing countries not only face a labour market with excessive supply in-
duced by the accelerating population growth, but also with limited or no social protections
(Fro¨lich and Haile, 2011). Households, therefore, become vulnerable to chronic food insecu-
rity when they are exposed to different shocks. Safety-net programs in developing countries
not only help households smooth consumption but also get households out of chronic poverty
(Devereux, 2002). The change in households’ poverty status, at least psychologically, may
change aspirations of their children. Kao and Tienda (1998) argue that the socio-economic
status of households plays a key role not only in favouring high education aspirations in
earlier grades but also in maintaining the aspired levels in later grades. Laajaj (2017) also
shows that economic prospects increase the planning horizon of the poor which again pre-
1
dicts asset accumulations. Ethiopian government launched a social protection program in
2005, the Productive Safety-Net Program (PSNP), to provide transfers to chronically food
insecure households. It is designed to supply predictable support to defined households; it
is a departure from previous social protection schemes of delivering emergency food when
a specific catastrophe happens. The program is expected to reach more than 10 million
beneficiaries in its current phase (PSNP Phase IV - 2014/15-2019/20) and the government
together with the donor community is now planning to expand it to urban areas (the first
phase of urban PSNP is planned to be run from 2016/17 to 2020/21). Given the program’s
magnitude and the important paradigm shift from temporary relief responses to long-term
preventive asset building programs, several studies have already documented the impact
of the PSNP on households in different respects. Gilligan et al. (2009) showed the public
works program of the PSNP affects individual calorie acquisition. Studies also revealed that
households’ food security and consumption are impacted by PSNP (Berhane et al. 2011
and Berhane et al. 2014). Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010) showed that food trans-
fers are superior to cash transfers in affecting income growth, livestock accumulation and
self-reported food security. Andersson et al. (2011) also evaluated the impacts of PSNP on
livestock and tree holdings and find that the program increased households’ tree holdings
while livestock holdings are unaffected. However, studies investigating the impacts of PSNP
on children are scant. Debela et al. (2015) and Porter and Goyal (2016) investigate the
impacts of the program on children’s health (mainly nutrition) and both studies document
positive effects. Studies also investigated the impacts of PSNP on the trade-offs between
education and work participation (Hoddinott et al. 2010; Woldehanna 2010). However, the
program is extremely expensive (in 2009, PSNP had an annual budget of 360 million USD,
roughly 1.2 % of Ethiopian GDP), therefore it is important to understand whether the pos-
itive effects are limited to the immediate target of the program, namely chronic poverty
and food insecurity of rural households, or it has long lasting effects on other dimensions of
individual well-being, such as for example targeted children and human capital investments.
Few studies have explored how aspirations of the poor can be lifted. For instance, Bernard
et al. (2015) studied how aspirations of poor people in remote rural Ethiopia improved after
watching documentaries of people in the same status changing their life without outside
intervention. Chiapa et al. (2012) explored the impacts of a social program and exposure
to professionals on the aspirations of parents for their children in Mexico, and found a
positive impact on the educational aspirations of parents for their children. They also checked
the correlations of parental aspirations and educational attainment of children. The study
mainly focused on households’ aspirations for their children without involving children’ s
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own educational aspirations. Beaman et al. (2012) also investigated the impact of female
leadership on girls’ aspirations and educational attainment exploiting a randomized natural
experiment in India, and found a significant impact of female leadership on girls’ career
aspirations and educational attainment. Ross (2017) studied the impact of India’s National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) on occupational aspirations and aspirations
gaps of children using the Young Lives data for India. However, it is appealing to see whether
actual transfers targeted to the most disadvantaged households as in PSNP in Ethiopia, have
an effect on children’s own educational aspirations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the Productive Safety-Net
Program and its eligibility criteria in selecting beneficiaries. Section 3 describes the data we
use in our study. Section 4 presents the methods used and the results obtained. Section 5
provides some robustness checks. Section 6 renders associations of aspirations and actual
outcomes. The last section concludes.
2. The Productive Safety-Net Program (PSNP)
The Productive Safety-Net Program (PSNP) is a social protection program launched by the
Ethiopian government in 2005 to provide transfers to chronically food insecure households.
The PSNP aims to respond to food insecurity arising from shocks or natural calamities
such as drought, flooding, pests, and so on, in addition to the chronic food needs of poor
households. The PSNP consists of 80% public work program that provides countercyclical
employment mostly on rural infrastructure and land rehabilitation projects and 20% direct
support program that provides unconditional cash or food transfer to vulnerable households
that have no able-bodied members to participate in public works. Once households have
become food-sufficient, they will be graduated1 from the program (Wiseman et al., 2010).
The number of people supported by PSNP has increased from 4.5 million in 2005 to 7.6
million in 2009.
The PSNP has been designed to respect the responsibilities of each level of the federal
administrative structure of the Ethiopian Government, which is composed of nine regions
and two administrative cities. Each region is then divided into woredas (districts), which are
administered by locally elected councils.2 Each woreda is subdivided into kebeles, the lowest
1The term ‘graduation’ refers to the movement of a household out of the PSNP. This occurs when a
household has improved its food security status to a level that shifts it from being classified as chronically
food insecure to food sufficient, and thus is no longer eligible for the PSNP.
2There are a total of 710 woredas.
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administrative layers that can be understood as neighborhood associations or wards. Finally,
in the rural areas, each kebele includes a number of villages or communities (Wiseman et al.,
2010). The selection process into PSNP proceeds as follows. The federal government first
identifies chronically food insecure woredas, i.e. districts that have been recipients of food
aid for at least 3 years. Using this criterion, the government identified 262 chronically
food insecure woredas in 2005 and increased to 290 woredas in 2009. Then, woredas select
chronically food insecure kebeles. Finally, households within these kebeles are selected to
participate in the PSNP according to a process that takes place at the community, kebele
and woreda levels. First, eligibility to PSNP depends on whether a household meets the
criteria set by the local administration (kebele), and whether the household is selected by
the Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF). Then, the list of eligible households,
finalized at the community level, should be approved at the kebele, woreda and regional levels
(Wiseman et al., 2010). The CFSTF select households on the basis of basic PSNP criteria,
and supplementary local criteria. The basic PSNP eligibility criteria are: Households that
faced a continuous food shortage, for 3 months in the last 3 years; those that suddenly
become more vulnerable and couldn’t support themselves over the last 3 to 6 months; and
those without family support and other social protections (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014).
3. The Data
This study uses a longitudinal data from the Young Lives (YL) survey. YL is an international
research project, coordinated by the University of Oxford, which follows the lives of 12,000
children in four developing countries, namely Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam over 15
years. The aim of the project is to identify the main drivers of child poverty, and assist local
policy makers. The sample in each country consists of two cohorts of children: a Younger-
Cohort of 2000 children born in 2001-2002, and an Older Cohort of 1,000 children, born
in 1994-95. To date, there are four rounds of the surveys which have been conducted in
2002, 2006, 2009 and 2013, respectively. Focusing on Ethiopia, YL samples were selected
from 20 sentinel sites following a three-stage sampling process. In the first stage, 5 regions,
including Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, Tigray, and Addis Ababa, an administrative city, were
selected. The main criterion was national coverage, and the selected regions account for
96% of the national population. Then from these regions, 20 woredas (districts) were chosen
with a pro-poor bias: the food deficit woredas were oversampled as the major goals of YL is
investigating childhood poverty and its dynamics. In the last stage, at least one kebele (the
smallest administrative unit) in each woreda was chosen, in order to constitute the sentinel
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sites. Finally, households containing children were randomly selected within the sites.3
The YL data include questions on educational aspirations and other related issues, which
were asked to the older cohort from the second round onwards (the children of the younger
cohort were too young to be asked about their aspirations in the second (then aged 4 to
5 years) and third (aged 7 to 8 years) rounds of the survey). The question on educational
aspirations was framed as: ”Imagine you had no constraints and could study for as long
as you liked, or go back to school if you have already left. What level of formal education
would you like to complete?”. The answer to this question is coded according to the highest
grade the child aspires to achieve, 1 to 12 indicating grades 1 to 12; 13 for technical and
vocational school and 14 for college degree and above. We recoded 14 to 15 (12 years of
school plus 3 years of higher institution) to interpret educational aspirations in terms of
years of education.
From the third round (2009) onwards households have been interviewed about their partici-
pation in PSNP as follows: (i) Was any member of household registered as a beneficiary of
the PSNP – Public Works program? (ii) Was any member of household registered as bene-
ficiary of Direct Support program (transfers of cash, food or other goods without requiring
individuals to work)? If households response is ’Yes’ to either one or both of the questions,
then the household would be regarded as a beneficiary of the PSNP program and belongs to
a ’treatment group’. Whereas if the response to both questions is ’No’, then the household
is considered as a ’control’ or ’comparison’ group.
In order to evaluate the effect of the PSNP on children’ s educational aspirations, we follow
Porter and Goyal (2016) who estimate the impact of the PSNP on child nutrition using a
differences-in-differences estimator (DID) at the child level. As in Porter and Goyal (2016),
the second round of the YL survey (conducted in 2006) is considered as a baseline since the
payment was delayed during the first year of the implementation of the program (2005/06)
(Gilligan et al., 2009) and no impacts of the program were experienced in 2006 (Woldehanna,
2010).
The PSNP was conducted in rural areas and therefore we restrict the sample excluding the
urban population. To improve the comparability of the groups of our analysis, two sites
where no households participated in the program were dropped from the sample.4
3Note one child per household is selected.
4The reason why there was no PSNP participation in these two sites is that the first site is a relatively
richer rural area in the outskirts of Debrezeit town in the Oromia region and the second site is a densely
populated rural area growing ’enset’ (false banana) in the SNNP region. Hence, we can see the profiles of
the two sites that they are relatively well off and we excluded them to have better comparison groups.
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Our analysis is, therefore, based on the older cohort of children, living in 11 rural sites, and
interviewed at the ages of 12, 15 and 19 in 2006, 2009 and 2013 respectively.
Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics of observable characteristics for the individuals in the
sample receiving the PSNP transfer (the treated group), and those living in the same areas
but not enrolled in the program (the control group). No statistical difference between the
mean of the treated and control groups is observed with respect to educational aspirations,
future plan for education and work, gender, travel time to school, and wealth. However,
the mean difference between the two groups seem to be significant with regard to household
compositions (the treatment group has a lower proportion of males aged 6 to 60 than the
control group), aid history (90% of the treatment group reported to have been receiving food
aid prior to PSNP while 36% of the control group reported to have received aid before PSNP),
caregiver’s aspirations (measured as children’s aspirations), cognitive outcome (based on the
score obtained on a mathematical test) and climatic shocks (a dummy that takes the value
of 1 if the household has experienced any natural disasters since the previous wave). One
concern of our analysis is that households receiving transfers from PSNP are different from
those not enrolled in PSNP for reasons that could affect our outcome of interest. However, our
econometric analysis will account for observable differences of the treatment and the control
groups by directly controlling for several covariates and by applying matching techniques.
4. Econometric strategy and results
This section describes the methodology used and the main results of our analysis. The effect
of PSNP on educational aspirations of children is analyzed using the differences-in-differences
(DID) estimator. Our objective of interest is to measure the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT). The ATT is given by:
ATT = E[A1 − A0|P = 1] = E[A1|P = 1]− E[A0|P = 1] (1)
Where A1 is the outcome, i.e. educational aspirations, of the treated, A0 is the outcome
of the untreated, and P indicates the treatment status which is equal to 1 if the individual
participates in PSNP and 0 otherwise. However, the problem is that we cannot observe
the untreated outcome for the treated, E[A0|P = 1]. We use the counter-factual outcome,
E[A0|P = 0], as an estimate for the unobserved outcome, E[A0|P = 1]. This might give
rise to the problem of selection bias, and to the concern that changes in the outcome of
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interest would have been systematically different in the treatment and control groups even
in the absence of the program. In our context, the PSNP was introduced to help chronically
and transitory food insecure rural households and to enable them withstand shocks like
droughts which are frequent in Ethiopia. Table 1 confirms that selection of households is
done in a non-random way and makes it difficult to select comparison groups. In addition,
we cannot test the assumption that trends in educational aspirations would be the same
for the treatment and control groups in the absence of the program, the so-called common
trends assumption, as children were not asked about their educational aspirations in the first
round of the survey.
In order to address these concerns, we follow a similar approach to the one carried out by
Porter and Goyal (2016) that analyze the impact of PSNP on child nutritional outcomes.
First, we add a large set of child and household control variables to control for observable
characteristics, including access to aid in previous rounds, climatic shocks, parental educa-
tional aspirations and sentinel site fixed effects. Second, by means of a propensity score
matching procedure, we restrict the sample in order to improve the comparability of the
treatment and control groups. Then, we compare results based on the “full sample” and the
“matched sample”.5
We estimate the following model:
Aihvt = β0 + β1Phv + β2Yt + β3(Phv ∗ Yt) + Xihvtβ4 + λv + uit (2)
Where the outcome variable Aihvt denotes educational aspirations of child i, in household h,
living in site v at time t; Phv is a treatment dummy that equals 1 for households participating
in PSNP at baseline and 0 for non-participants; Yt is a time dummy that equals one if year
is 2009 or beyond and zero if year is 2006; and Xihvt is a set of child and household
characteristics living in site v at time t,6 λv are sentinel site fixed effects. In our case, β3 can
be interpreted as the effect of PSNP on educational aspirations after controlling for household
5For robustness, Porter and Goyal (2016) also restrict the comparison group using a propensity score
matching technique based on pre-program observable household characteristics. In addition, they also con-
sider a sample restriction based on households who were shortlisted for the program but were not able
to participate due to budget constraints. Unfortunately, we cannot use the shortlisted comparison group
because we will retain very few observations as our sample includes only the older cohort of children.
6Control variables include: a dummy for the sex of the child, travel time to school (in minutes) for children
enrolled in school, a wealth index of the household, a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the household head
is a male, dummies for household composition, dummies to control for the level of education of the mother,
a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the household had access to aid in previous rounds, a dummy if the
household had experienced climatic shocks during the period of interest, a variable indicating the cognitive
outcome of the child, educational aspirations of the caregiver.
7
and child characteristics, and it can be estimated using ordinary least square method (Meyer,
1995). Moreover, β1 is the estimated mean difference in educational aspirations of children
between the treatment and control groups before the intervention; while β2 is the expected
mean change in educational aspirations from before to after the intervention period in the
control group and indicates the effect of time in the absence of the program.
Figure 1 shows aspirations of the participants and the non-participants both before and after
the intervention. The descriptive evidence suggests that aspirations for college increase after
the program for the participants while they are pretty stable for the non-participants. This
might indicate that the program raises aspirations of children.
Table 2 presents the DID estimation results of the impact of PSNP on educational aspira-
tions of children on the ’full sample’ (Panel A) and on the ’matched sample’ (Panel B) for
the 2009 survey round, three years after the program’s commencement. Column 1 presents
the results controlling for child characteristics including a gender dummy and time taken
to the nearest school; household characteristics including wealth, composition and mother’s
education, and site level dummies. Table 1 shows that there is a significant mean difference
in receiving aid prior to PSNP between the treatment and control groups. To control for
possible differences in this respect, the aid history of households prior to the program intro-
duction is added as an additional covariate in column 2. Households’ experiences of different
natural calamities such as drought, flooding, pests, etc. are significant contributors for their
vulnerability and food insecurity, and this may also affect educational aspirations. Then, in
column 3 we control for climatic shocks. Finally, in column 4 and column 5 we additionally
control for cognitive outcome of children and care-giver’s aspirations for the child in ques-
tion, respectively. Besides, all the regressions include site dummies to control for persistent
local characteristics that could affect educational aspirations, such as local labour market
characteristics.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the estimation results for the full sample. PSNP has a positive
and statistically significant effect on educational aspirations across all the estimated spec-
ifications. Column (1) shows that PSNP increases educational aspirations by 0.74 school
years after controlling for child and household characteristics, and site level dummies. The
magnitude remains similar when we additionally control for aid history of the household
(column (2)). Furthermore, the impact of PSNP on educational aspirations of children in-
creases to 0.82 school years and 0.92 school years when we control for shocks and cognitive
outcome, respectively. The results convey that the magnitude and precision still stand when
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we include parental educational aspirations for the child in question.7
Panel B of Table 2 depicts the DID estimation results on the matched sample. More specif-
ically, we construct a comparison group based on a Kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.1
on the pre-program child and household characteristics, including indicators for household
wealth and vulnerability which includes animal and land ownership, the number of male
and female adult members, gender and age of the household head, household’s aid history,
housing quality, shocks, parental aspirations and cognitive outcome. We choose the Kernel
matching because it satisfies the balancing characteristics. To check for balance, a ’pstest’
is used after matching. The ’pstest’ indicates that the mean percent bias is below 5%.8 The
regressions are then conducted on observations which are on the common support. Similar
to the results in Panel A, we find that the PSNP has a positive and statistically significant
impact at the 1 percent level on educational aspirations. The estimation results provide very
similar coefficients with respect to the full sample when all the covariates are included.
As we have information on the children’s educational aspirations for three periods (the
baseline, 2006, and two periods after the implementation of the program), we can estimate
not only the impact of the program in the short-run (after 3 years), but also in the long-run
(after 6 years). Table 3 presents the DID estimates from running regressions on the 2013
sample (6 years after the start of the program), including new entrants into the program (8
households) and incumbent beneficiaries from 2009, and excluding individuals that did not
take part to the 2013 interview. The results in Panel A of Table 3 reveal that the impact of
the program is not different from zero except in the last column when cognitive outcome is
controlled for.9 There are two possible explanations for this difference in significance in the
estimates on the full sample between Table 2 and 3. First, it might be that children in the
treatment group have caught up those in the control group and therefore the PSNP does not
exert a differential effect on the disadvantaged in the long run. An alternative explanation
is that panel A estimates are biased due to graduation from PSNP. YL asks households
whether they graduated, i.e. whether they are not receiving the transfer because they are
not considered poor anymore. About 36% of the respondents who were treated in the 2006
wave reported that they are no more eligible. These PSNP graduates are in the treatment
group but they did not receive any benefit in 2013, as those in the control group. The effect
is a bias towards zero of the coefficient. The matched sample should clean at least partly
this bias. In fact, evidence from the matched sample (Panel B of Table 3) is again in favour
7Table 2 shows only the coefficients of interest. Estimation results with the full covariates are reported
in Appendix A.
8See the figure in Appendix B for the balance before and after matching.
9In this case we cannot control for care-giver’s aspirations, because this variable is missing.
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of a statistically significant effect of PSNP on aspirations even in the long run. Due to the
reduced sample size anyway, point estimates are less precisely estimated and are more model
dependent than in the short run.
In general, our results suggest that the safety-net program in Ethiopia, designed to lift out the
food insecure households out of the chronic poverty, also affects the educational aspirations
of children. In 2009 (three years after the program intervention), an impact on aspirations
is confirmed for both the full sample and the matched sample. In 2013 (six years later),
however, the effect on aspirations is positive and statistically significant when the matched
sample is considered or when all the covariates are included in the full sample.
5. Robustness checks
PSNP transfers are delivered in two variants: the public works program and the direct sup-
port program. Participants of the public works program (PWP) are required to provide
labour to pre-designed public works so as to get the transfers. The direct support program,
instead, is unconditional cash or food transfers to households without able-bodied members
who can contribute labour to public works. The effects of the two variants on our outcome of
interest might be different. From one side, studies documented that unconditional transfers
have a positive impact on the livelihoods of poor households. For instance, Haushofer and
Shapiro (2016) documented a significant impact of unconditional cash transfers on house-
holds’ economic and psychological well-being in Kenya. Baird et al. (2014) find that both
conditional and unconditional cash transfers have an impact on schooling, but conditional
transfers have a higher impact provided that the conditions are school related. Therefore,
we expect a positive impact of the PSNP direct support program component on aspirations
of the children. On the other hand, children from households involved in the PWP may
substitute working adult members either in household chores or other household tasks. This
might negatively interfere with their education and their desire for education. Haile and
Haile (2012) find that child labour, which could include domestic chores and paid works, is
associated with lower educational attainment. In our sample, only 7% of the households are
part of the direct support program, however we run our DID estimation only on the sample
of PWP. Table 4 presents the estimation results for the full sample and the matched sample
of PWP. The results are similar to the findings in Table 2.
In our main analysis, we consider only children currently enrolled in education, because the
control variable distance to school (minutes) is available only for children currently attending
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school. This is an important covariate to be included in our analysis, since transportation
costs may discourage educational aspirations of children. Education enrollment may have
an influence on the educational aspirations of children and our results might be driven by
sample selection. For robustness, we include in our sample out of school children (without
controlling for distance to school) and conduct the DID estimation. Table 5 depicts the
impacts on aspirations for the full sample and the matched sample. The results confirm that
PSNP has a positive and significant impact at the 1 percent level on the years of educational
aspirations. This suggests that the results in our main analysis are not driven by sample
selection.
As an additional robustness check, we consider an alternative outcome variable, whether
children would like to make plans for their future education and work, which is future
oriented and related to future investments. This outcome variable is an indicator of forward-
looking behaviour and shown to be correlated with future investments (Dercon and Singh,
2013). Bernard and Taffesse (2014) also stated three distinctive features of aspirations:
aspirations are future oriented, aspirations are goals in which people invest their time and
effort to realize them, and aspirations are perceived as ambitions to reach multidimensional
life outcomes that affect the individual’s future behaviour. To this end, we examine whether
children’s desire to plan about their future work and education is also affected by PSNP. We
run the DID estimation using the same sample of households as in our main analysis. In
the survey, children were asked whether they wanted to make plans for future education and
work as follows: ”I like to make plans for my future studies and work” and the response is
categorical running from 1, indicating strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree in round three
while 1 to 4 in the second round. To normalize the question, a z-score10 of each observation
is computed.
Table 6 presents the results of plan for future education and work. They convey that PSNP
positively impacts children’s desire to plan for future education and work which is in line with
our results above. This indicates that the program affects children’s educational aspirations
which might also be reflected somewhat on their desire to plan for future education.
10The z-score is computed by subtracting mean from each observations and dividing it by the standard
deviation.
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6. Aspirations and years of education
The aim of our paper is to explore whether educational aspirations are affected by an anti-
poverty program. We claim that educational aspirations are very important for future educa-
tion and work. A few studies have documented the effects of aspirations on future education
(see for instance Favara (2017) for Ethiopia). In this section, we provide evidence on the
correlation between aspirations and actual educational attainment in rural Ethiopia.
In Ethiopia, primary education consists of two cycles: the first cycle includes grade 1 to 4,
and the second cycle includes grade 5 to 8. Even if primary education is compulsory by law
(children should start going to school at age 7), late enrollment is a common phenomenon,
especially in rural areas. In addition, it is quite common that children drop out of school
and come back after a certain period. These behaviors lead children to reach compulsory
educational targets at later age and are a barrier for further education. At the end of second
cycle primary education, students are required to sit for 8th grade regional examination so
as to enter high school. Secondary education consists of two cycles: the first cycle is the
general secondary education including grade 9 to 10 and the second cycle is preparatory
school including grade 11 to 12. Given the system, completed primary education can be
already seen as a success in rural Ethiopia. Table 7 shows that on average, at age 15 and 19,
children have completed about 4.8 and 7.1 years of education, respectively. Data suggest that
it is crucial to increase educational attainment of young people. In this respect, educational
aspirations may be of primary importance.
Table 8 presents the difference in the mean proportion of average years of schooling be-
tween those aspiring for college and those aspiring lower than college in the previous wave.
Unconditional correlations show that higher aspirations in the previous wave are positively
associated with the number of years of education completed at the ages of 15 (round 3) and
19 (round 4). In particular the difference in the years of education between those aspiring
for college and those aspiring lower than college in the previous wave are 0.62 and 1.92 years
in 2009 and 2013 respectively, and the differences are statistically significant.
Pooling the data, Table 9 tests whether the positive correlation between aspirations (lagged)
and actual years of education holds after controlling for characteristics at individual and
household level. More specifically, Column (1) includes individual controls (child’s sex and
travel time to school in minutes) and household controls (sex of household head, wealth
index, mother education dummies, household composition dummies), wave dummies and
village dummies and shows a positive and statistically significant effect at 1 percent level
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of (lagged) aspirations on years of education. The results are robust to the inclusion of
additional covariates, such as climatic shocks, cognitive outcome, and whether the household
has ever received any aid before the program (column (2)).
As we want to link aspirations to actual educational outcomes, for robustness, in column (3)
and (4), we include estimations only on the non-participants of the PSNP so as to partly
avoid the program’s intervention. The results convey a positive association of aspirations
with actual educational outcomes even when considering only the control group. This implies
that aspirations are a good predictors of future actual educational attainment as it also has
been confirmed by Favara (2017) for Ethiopia and Chiapa et al. (2012) for Mexico.
7. Conclusions
Aspirations play a key role in the investment decisions of individuals towards their future
endeavors. Children’s educational aspirations especially enhances later educational attain-
ment. However, in developing countries, aspirations might be muﬄed by the extreme poverty
level of individuals. In understanding how to break the cycle of poverty, it is important to
examine how aspirations of the poor can be encouraged. Using Young Lives’ longitudinal
data in Ethiopia, we investigate the impacts of the Ethiopian PSNP on educational aspira-
tions of children.
We consider differences-in-differences regressions on a “full sample” and we control for sev-
eral covariates. We also use matching techniques to further curb the control group. The
results convey significant and positive impacts of PSNP on aspirations and suggest that the
program lifts up children’ s educational aspirations. As the vast majority of the population of
Ethiopia depends on a small agricultural livelihood, food insecurity, caused mostly by natu-
ral calamities, is a threat to the rural households who mostly depend on rain-fed agriculture.
Our results imply that small transfers may mean a lot for the food insecure rural households;
they could sustain their life and affect their livelihoods in different directions: in this case
we show that a financial safety-net can have important spillover effects on education.
We also look at the impacts of PSNP 6 years after its implementation, in order to assess
whether the program has a long-run effect on aspirations. In a longer spell between the
transfers and the observed outcome, individuals may change their aspirations for reasons
that remain unknown to the econometrician. Results are therefore less robust, but still
point towards a positive effect of PSNP on educational aspirations of children.
All in all, we find that PSNP affects educational aspirations, which are an important deter-
13
minant of actual educational attainment.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Kjetil Bjorvatn, Giorgio Brunello, Rachid Laajaj, and to the audiences
at conferences in St. Gallen (EALE), Bari (Economics of Global Interactions Conference),
Paris (DIAL 2017 Conference on Development Economics) and Addis Ababa (2017 Ethiopian
Economics Association conference) for comments and suggestions. The data used in this
publication come from Young Lives, a 15-year study of the changing nature of childhood
poverty in Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam (www.younglives.org.uk). Young Lives is
funded by UK aid from the Department for International Development (DFID). The views
expressed here are those of the authors. They are not necessarily those of Young Lives, the
University of Oxford, DFID or other funders.
14
References
Andersson, C., Mekonnen, A., and Stage, J. (2011). Impacts of the Productive Safety Net
Program in Ethiopia on livestock and tree holdings of rural households. Journal of
Development Economics, 94(1):119–126.
Baird, S., Ferreira, F. H., O¨zler, B., and Woolcock, M. (2014). Conditional, unconditional and
everything in between: a systematic review of the effects of cash transfer programmes
on schooling outcomes. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 6(1):1–43.
Beaman, L., Duflo, E., Pande, R., and Topalova, P. (2012). Female leadership raises aspi-
rations and educational attainment for girls: A policy experiment in India. Science,
335(6068):582–586.
Berhane, G., Gilligan, D. O., Hoddinott, J., Kumar, N., and Taffesse, A. S. (2014). Can
social protection work in Africa? The impact of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net
Programme. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 63(1):1–26.
Berhane, G., Hoddinott, J., Kumar, N., and Taffesse, A. S. (2011). The impact of Ethiopia’s
productive safety nets and household asset building programme: 2006–2010. Technical
report, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Bernard, T., Dercon, S., Orkin, K., and Seyoum Taffesse, A. (2015). Will Video Kill the
Radio Star? Assessing the Potential of Targeted Exposure to Role Models through
Video. The World Bank Economic Review, 29:226–237.
Bernard, T. and Taffesse, A. S. (2014). Aspirations: An approach to measurement with
validation using Ethiopian data. Journal of African Economies, 23(2):189–224.
Chiapa, C., Garrido, J. L., and Prina, S. (2012). The effect of social programs and exposure
to professionals on the educational aspirations of the poor. Economics of Education
Review, 31(5):778–798.
Dalton, P. S., Ghosal, S., and Mani, A. (2016). Poverty and aspirations failure. The Economic
Journal, 126(590):165–188.
Debela, B. L., Shively, G., and Holden, S. T. (2015). Does Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net
Program Improve Child Nutrition? Food Security, 7(6):1273–1289.
Dercon, S. and Singh, A. (2013). From nutrition to aspirations and self-efficacy: gender bias
over time among children in four countries. World Development, 45:31–50.
Devereux, S. (2002). Can social safety nets reduce chronic poverty? Development Policy
Review, 20(5):657–675.
Duflo, E. (2006). Poor but rational? In Banerjee, A., Benabou, R., and Mookherjee, D.,
editors, Understanding poverty, pages 367–378. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
15
Favara, M. (2017). Do dreams come true? Aspirations and educational attainments of
Ethiopian boys and girls. Journal of African Economies, Forthcoming:1–23.
Fro¨lich, M. and Haile, G. (2011). Labour markets in developing countries. Labour Economics,
18(Supplement 1):S2 – S6.
Genicot, G. and Ray, D. (2017). Aspirations and inequality. Econometrica, 85(2):489–519.
Gilligan, D. O., Hoddinott, J., and Taffesse, A. S. (2009). The impact of Ethiopia’s Pro-
ductive Safety Net Programme and its linkages. The Journal of Development Studies,
45(10):1684–1706.
Haile, G. and Haile, B. (2012). Child labour and child schooling in rural Ethiopia: nature
and trade-off. Education Economics, 20(4):365–385.
Haushofer, J. and Shapiro, J. (2016). The Short-term Impact of Unconditional Cash Trans-
fers to the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 131(4):1973–2042.
Hoddinott, J., Gilligan, D. O., and Taffesse, A. S. (2010). The impact of Ethiopia’s produc-
tive safety net program on schooling and child labor. In Handa, S., Devereux, S., and
Webb, D. E., editors, Social Protection for Africa’s Children, pages 71–96. Routledge.
Kao, G. and Tienda, M. (1998). Educational aspirations of minority youth. American
Journal of Education, 106(3):349–384.
Laajaj, R. (2017). Endogenous time horizon and behavioral poverty trap: Theory and
Evidence from Mozambique. Journal of Development Economics, 127:187–208.
Meyer, B. D. (1995). Natural and quasi-experiments in economics. Journal of Business &
Economic Statistics, 13(2):151–161.
Ministry of Agriculture, E. (2014). Productive Safety Net Programme Phase IV Programme
Implementation Manual. Addis Ababa: Ethiopia.
Porter, C. and Goyal, R. (2016). Social protection for all ages? Impacts of Ethiopia’s
Productive Safety Net Program on child nutrition. Social Science & Medicine, 159:92–
99.
Ray, D. (2006). Aspirations, poverty, and economic change. In Banerjee, A., Benabou, R.,
and Mookherjee, D., editors, Understanding poverty, pages 409–421. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Riley, E. (2017). Increasing students’ aspirations: the impact of Queen of Katwe on stu-
dents’ educational attainment ( Working Paper WPS/2017-13). Centre for the Study
of African Economies, University of Oxford: Oxford.
Ross, P. H. (2017). The Aspirations Gap and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from
Indian Adolescents. mimeo, Boston University.
Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Devereux, S. (2010). Cash transfers and high food prices: explaining
16
outcomes on Ethiopia’s productive safety net programme. Food Policy, 35(4):274–285.
Schoon, I. and Parsons, S. (2002). Teenage aspirations for future careers and occupational
outcomes. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 60(2):262–288.
Serneels, P. and Dercon, S. (2014). Aspirations, poverty and education: evidence from India
(Young Lives Working Paper No. 125). Young Lives: Oxford.
Sewell, W. H., Haller, A. O., and Ohlendorf, G. W. (1970). The educational and early oc-
cupational status attainment process: Replication and revision. American Sociological
Review, 35(6):1014–1027.
Wiseman, W., Van Domelen, J., and Coll-Black, S. (2010). Designing and implementing a
rural safety net in a low income setting: Lessons learned from Ethiopia’s Productive
Safety Net Program 2005-2009. Technical report, World Bank, Washington DC.
Woldehanna, T. (2010). Productive Safety Net Program and Children’s Time Use Between
Work and Schooling in Ethiopia. In Cockburn, J., Kabubo-Mariara, J., and Springer-
Link, editors, Child Welfare in Developing Countries, pages 157–209. Springer, New
York.
17
Tables and figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by treatment status at the baseline (2006)
Control Treated Difference P-value
Years of education aspirations 13.6016 13.3544 0.2472 0.2312
Future plan for education and work -0.0017 -0.1349 0.1332 0.1500
Household and Child characteristics
Child’s sex 0.5073 0.5294 -0.0221 0.6254
Travel time to school (in minutes) 26.8259 29.7598 -2.9339 0.1332
Wealth index 0.2065 0.1958 0.0107 0.2650
Sex of household head 0.8650 0.7149 0.1500 0.0000
Mother’s education-Adult literacy* 0.1271 0.1208 0.0063 0.8403
Mother’s education-Grade 1 and above 0.3877 0.1946 0.1931 0.0000
Household composition
Number of males aged 0-5 0.3759 0.3710 0.0049 0.9290
Number of males aged 6-12 0.7336 0.6063 0.1272 0.0552
Number of males aged 13-17 0.6168 0.4072 0.2095 0.0002
Number of males aged 18-60 1.6387 1.3801 0.2586 0.0070
Number of males aged 61+ 0.1387 0.1765 -0.0378 0.2570
Number of females aged 0-5 0.4051 0.4163 -0.0112 0.8413
Number of females aged 6-12 0.5985 0.6199 -0.0214 0.7294
Number of females aged 13-17 0.6460 0.5882 0.0578 0.3760
Number of females aged 18-60 1.6423 1.5747 0.0677 0.3834
Number of females aged 61+ 0.0985 0.0679 0.0307 0.2362
Parent’s years of education aspirations
Years of aspirations 13.9436 13.5760 0.3676 0.0656
Aid history
Ever aid 0.3686 0.9095 -0.5409 0.0000
Cognitive outcome score
Z raw math -0.3608 -0.1924 -0.1683 0.0726
Shocks
Shock-drought 0.5255 0.5792 -0.0536 0.2340
Shock-flooding 0.3066 0.1131 0.1934 0.0000
Shock-erosion 0.1825 0.0679 0.1146 0.0002
Shock-frost 0.1642 0.0950 0.0692 0.0243
Shock-pests on crops 0.2080 0.0498 0.1583 0.0000
Shock-crop failure 0.3358 0.3937 -0.0579 0.1833
Shock-pests on storage 0.0730 0.0407 0.0323 0.1291
Shock-pests on livestock 0.0985 0.0407 0.0578 0.0137
Observations 276 221
* Mother’s level of education has three categories: No education (66%), Grade one and above (22%) and Adult literacy (12%).
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Table 2: Impacts of PSNP on Children’s Educational Aspirations - 2009 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full sample
PSNP participation -0.464∗ -0.411 -0.457∗ -0.465∗ -0.407∗
(0.244) (0.255) (0.257) (0.251) (0.236)
Year dummy (2009) -0.372 -0.363 -0.434 -0.510∗ -0.460∗
(0.296) (0.298) (0.290) (0.277) (0.266)
DID 0.740∗∗ 0.739∗∗ 0.819∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗
(0.343) (0.343) (0.340) (0.331) (0.312)
N 765 764 764 756 749
Panel B: Matched sample
PSNP participation -0.538∗∗ -0.463∗ -0.515∗ -0.497∗ -0.436∗
(0.255) (0.263) (0.264) (0.259) (0.242)
Year dummy (2009) -0.537∗ -0.539∗ -0.619∗∗ -0.585∗∗ -0.502∗
(0.304) (0.303) (0.296) (0.291) (0.280)
DID 0.901∗∗ 0.911∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗
(0.357) (0.355) (0.352) (0.347) (0.326)
N 714 714 714 714 713
Household controls & village dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Received aid before 2006 NO YES YES YES YES
Shocks NO NO YES YES YES
Cognitive outcome NO NO NO YES YES
Caregiver’s aspirations NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at child level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is years of educational aspirations. Covariates includes gender
and time taken to school as child controls; household controls consisting of wealth index, household head
sex, mother’s education and household composition based on age and sex; shocks include drought, flooding,
erosion, frost, pests on crops, crop failure, pests on storage, and pests on livestock; cognitive outcome
includes z-score of maths test scores of children where the z-score is computed on the raw scores of maths
test administered for the children in question; and parental aspirations are years of education that parents
are aspiring for their child to complete. Village (site) level dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 3: Impacts of PSNP on Children’s Educational Aspirations (2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full sample
PSNP participation -0.366 -0.238 -0.211 -0.129
(0.372) (0.383) (0.368) (0.351)
Year dummy (2013) 0.853∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.379
(0.253) (0.254) (0.270) (0.241)
DID 0.544 0.548 0.656 0.923∗∗
(0.402) (0.404) (0.412) (0.386)
N 416 416 416 404
Panel B: Matched sample
PSNP Participation -0.381 -0.210 -0.211 -0.185
(0.422) (0.423) (0.401) (0.379)
Time dummy (2013) 0.754∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗ 0.244
(0.269) (0.269) (0.284) (0.251)
DID 0.758∗ 0.783∗ 0.948∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.456) (0.463) (0.426)
N 373 373 373 362
Household controls & village dummies YES YES YES YES
Received aid before 2006 NO YES YES YES
Shocks NO NO YES YES
Cognitive outcome NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at child level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is years of educational aspirations. Covariates includes gender
and time taken to school as child controls; household controls consisting of wealth index, household head
sex, mother’s education and household composition based on age and sex; shocks include drought, flooding,
erosion, frost, pests on crops, crop failure, pests on storage, and pests on livestock; and cognitive outcome
includes z-score of maths test scores of children where the z-score is computed on the raw scores of maths
test administered for the children in question. Village (site) level dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 4: Impacts of PSNP on educational aspirations (2009 - only PWP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All
PSNP participation -0.476∗ -0.441∗ -0.481∗ -0.489∗ -0.425∗
(0.248) (0.257) (0.259) (0.254) (0.239)
Time dummy (2009) -0.360 -0.351 -0.424 -0.489∗ -0.431
(0.309) (0.310) (0.303) (0.289) (0.279)
DID 0.759∗∗ 0.756∗∗ 0.840∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗
(0.355) (0.354) (0.351) (0.342) (0.324)
N 745 744 744 736 729
Matched sample
PSNP participation -0.563∗∗ -0.499∗ -0.549∗∗ -0.535∗∗ -0.460∗
(0.259) (0.266) (0.267) (0.262) (0.244)
Time dummy (2009) -0.511 -0.514 -0.592∗ -0.539∗ -0.459
(0.314) (0.313) (0.307) (0.303) (0.292)
DID 0.897∗∗ 0.907∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗
(0.368) (0.366) (0.363) (0.357) (0.338)
N 697 697 697 697 696
Household controls YES YES YES YES YES
Received aid before 2006 NO YES YES YES YES
Shocks NO NO YES YES YES
Cognitive outcome NO NO NO YES YES
Caregiver’s aspirations NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at child level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is years of educational aspirations. Covariates includes gender
and time taken to school as child controls; household controls consisting of wealth index, household head
sex, mother’s education and household composition based on age and sex; shocks include drought, flooding,
erosion, frost, pests on crops, crop failure, pests on storage, and pests on livestock; cognitive outcome
includes z-score of maths test scores of children where the z-score is computed on the raw scores of maths
test administered for the children in question; and parental aspirations are years of education that parents
are aspiring for their child to complete. Village (site) level dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 5: Impacts of PSNP on educational aspirations (2009 - Including non-enrolled children)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample
PSNP participation -0.570∗∗ -0.450 -0.505∗ -0.439∗ -0.385
(0.262) (0.278) (0.276) (0.264) (0.247)
Time dummy 2009 -0.530∗ -0.494 -0.608∗∗ -0.643∗∗ -0.578∗∗
(0.300) (0.301) (0.297) (0.286) (0.274)
DID 1.120∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.210∗∗∗ 1.244∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.373) (0.369) (0.354) (0.328)
N 839 837 837 824 812
Matched sample
PSNP participation -0.564∗∗ -0.458∗ -0.519∗ -0.510∗ -0.475∗
(0.264) (0.276) (0.272) (0.267) (0.250)
Time dummy 2009 -0.624∗∗ -0.621∗∗ -0.725∗∗ -0.701∗∗ -0.614∗∗
(0.308) (0.309) (0.302) (0.299) (0.288)
DID 1.149∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗ 1.294∗∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.381) (0.376) (0.373) (0.346)
N 767 767 767 767 761
Household controls & village dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Received aid before 2006 NO YES YES YES YES
Shocks NO NO YES YES YES
Cognitive outcome NO NO NO YES YES
Caregiver’s aspirations NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at child level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is years of educational aspirations. Covariates includes gender
and time taken to school as child controls; household controls consisting of wealth index, household head
sex, mother’s education and household composition based on age and sex; shocks include drought, flooding,
erosion, frost, pests on crops, crop failure, pests on storage, and pests on livestock; cognitive outcome
includes z-score of maths test scores of children where the z-score is computed on the raw scores of maths
test administered for the children in question; and parental aspirations are years of education that parents
are aspiring for their child to complete. Village (site) level dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 6: Impacts of PSNP on Children’s desire to plan for the future
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample
PSNP participation -0.296∗∗∗ -0.218∗ -0.243∗∗ -0.245∗∗ -0.246∗∗
(0.109) (0.114) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118)
Time dummy (2009) -0.167∗ -0.166∗ -0.190∗ -0.196∗ -0.193∗
(0.0962) (0.0966) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103)
DID 0.267∗ 0.273∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.282∗
(0.145) (0.145) (0.146) (0.147) (0.148)
N 763 762 762 755 748
Matched
PSNP participation -0.279∗∗ -0.204∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.226∗ -0.221∗
(0.111) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.115)
Time dummy (2009) -0.174∗ -0.177∗ -0.204∗ -0.200∗ -0.195∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107)
DID 0.313∗∗ 0.323∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.319∗∗
(0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146)
N 713 713 713 713 712
Household controls & village dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Received aid before 2006 NO YES YES YES YES
Shocks NO NO YES YES YES
Cognitive outcome NO NO NO YES YES
Caregiver’s aspirations NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at child level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is children’s desire to plan about their future work and edu-
cation. Covariates includes gender and time taken to school as child controls; household controls consisting
of wealth index, household head sex, mother’s education and household composition based on age and sex;
shocks include drought, flooding, erosion, frost, pests on crops, crop failure, pests on storage, and pests on
livestock; cognitive outcome includes z-score of maths test scores of children where the z-score is computed
on the raw scores of maths test administered for the children in question; and parental aspirations are years
of education that parents are aspiring for their child to complete. Village (site) level dummies are included
in all columns.
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Table 7: Years of education by survey rounds
Survey rounds Average years of education Std. Dev N
2006 (Age 12) 2.581 1.639 494
2009 (Age 15) 4.797 2.133 482
2013 (Age 19) 7.090 2.873 412
Table 8: Education completion by lag of aspirations
Aspirations in the previous wave
2009 (R3) 2013 (R4)
N Mean N Mean
<College 183 4.639 153 5.954
College 258 5.244 250 7.872
Difference (College - <College) 0.605 1.918
P-value 0.002 0.000
Table 9: Lag of Aspirations and actual years of education
All Sample Non-participants of PSNP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag of years of Aspirations 0.160∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0327) (0.0536) (0.0429)
Constant 3.810∗∗∗ 4.556∗∗∗ 3.405∗∗∗ 3.888∗∗∗
(0.740) (0.675) (0.945) (0.865)
N 522 517 275 271
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at child level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is actual years of education. Covariates include child and
household controls. Columns 2 and 4 also include additional controls consisting of climatic shocks, cognitive
outcome, and whether households received any aid before the program. Village (site) level dummies and
year dummies are included in all the columns.
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Figure 1: Years of educational aspirations by treatment status
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Appendix A Impact of PSNP on educational aspirations (full covariates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSNP participation -0.464∗ -0.411 -0.457∗ -0.465∗ -0.407∗
(0.244) (0.255) (0.257) (0.251) (0.236)
Time dummy 2009 -0.372 -0.363 -0.434 -0.510∗ -0.460∗
(0.296) (0.298) (0.290) (0.277) (0.266)
DID 0.740∗∗ 0.739∗∗ 0.819∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗
(0.343) (0.343) (0.340) (0.331) (0.312)
Child’s sex - male 0.573∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗
(0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.148) (0.139)
Travel time to school (in minutes) -0.00690 -0.00712 -0.00722 -0.00617 -0.00604
(0.00548) (0.00547) (0.00545) (0.00470) (0.00442)
Wealth index 0.0657 -0.00266 -0.0293 0.0542 -0.149
(0.977) (0.988) (0.964) (0.881) (0.825)
Sex of household head 0.0174 0.0142 -0.134 -0.110 -0.0880
(0.217) (0.216) (0.216) (0.211) (0.193)
momedu==Adult literacy 0.321 0.314 0.380 0.379∗ 0.255
(0.233) (0.234) (0.231) (0.230) (0.208)
momedu==Religious education 1.287∗∗ 1.213∗ 1.787∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 1.835∗∗∗
(0.615) (0.633) (0.686) (0.737) (0.671)
mom primary -0.0578 -0.0731 -0.0463 -0.0459 -0.0644
(0.251) (0.255) (0.259) (0.250) (0.243)
Number of males aged 0-5 0.184 0.182 0.167 0.283∗ 0.204
(0.149) (0.150) (0.152) (0.150) (0.144)
Number of males aged 6-12 0.0751 0.0744 0.0977 0.0568 0.0187
(0.121) (0.121) (0.123) (0.120) (0.114)
Number of males aged 13-17 -0.0588 -0.0644 -0.0193 0.0214 -0.0570
(0.162) (0.163) (0.167) (0.162) (0.149)
Number of males aged 18-60 0.0981 0.0966 0.116 0.136∗ 0.102
(0.0703) (0.0704) (0.0726) (0.0711) (0.0663)
Number of males aged 61+ 0.236 0.223 0.248 0.176 0.148
(0.194) (0.194) (0.192) (0.183) (0.166)
Number of females aged 0-5 -0.0439 -0.0415 -0.0550 -0.0492 -0.0143
(0.136) (0.135) (0.134) (0.131) (0.123)
Number of females aged 6-12 0.176 0.173 0.174 0.0911 0.0324
(0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.121) (0.112)
Number of females aged 13-17 -0.281∗ -0.277∗ -0.220 -0.160 -0.221
(0.159) (0.158) (0.154) (0.149) (0.142)
Number of females aged 18-60 0.101 0.107 0.0994 0.0985 0.119
(0.0857) (0.0848) (0.0842) (0.0818) (0.0773)
Number of females aged 61+ -0.167 -0.157 -0.158 0.0443 0.0996
(0.310) (0.304) (0.304) (0.283) (0.273)
Sentinel site ID=5 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Sentinel site ID=6 -0.542 -0.522 -0.458 -0.547 -0.270
(0.391) (0.392) (0.432) (0.414) (0.418)
Sentinel site ID=7 -0.617∗ -0.621∗ -0.464 -0.527 -0.413
(0.373) (0.373) (0.366) (0.339) (0.365)
Sentinel site ID=8 -1.240∗∗∗ -1.205∗∗∗ -1.048∗∗∗ -1.022∗∗∗ -0.836∗∗
(0.361) (0.361) (0.357) (0.334) (0.355)
Sentinel site ID=9 -0.858∗∗ -0.862∗∗ -0.570 -0.540 -0.389
(0.391) (0.389) (0.425) (0.402) (0.421)
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Sentinel site ID=15 -1.089∗∗ -1.101∗∗ -0.722 -0.601 -0.873∗
(0.459) (0.460) (0.459) (0.439) (0.447)
Sentinel site ID=16 -0.0852 -0.132 0.00728 0.445 0.208
(0.398) (0.401) (0.426) (0.403) (0.405)
Sentinel site ID=17 0.256 0.272 0.506 0.296 0.131
(0.363) (0.361) (0.387) (0.363) (0.378)
Sentinel site ID=18 0.118 0.153 0.454 0.247 0.293
(0.378) (0.378) (0.414) (0.381) (0.389)
Sentinel site ID=20 0.361 0.394 0.440 0.104 -0.0472
(0.276) (0.280) (0.286) (0.264) (0.289)
Sentinel site ID=90 -0.189 -0.212 -0.280 -0.538 -0.803∗
(0.503) (0.503) (0.449) (0.415) (0.433)
ever aid -0.145 -0.0814 -0.0898 -0.0981
(0.212) (0.220) (0.214) (0.200)
shock-drought -0.217 -0.280 -0.300∗
(0.181) (0.173) (0.172)
shock-flooding -0.446 -0.526∗ -0.495∗∗
(0.285) (0.277) (0.251)
shock-erosion -0.0786 -0.0609 0.152
(0.355) (0.346) (0.324)
shock-frost -0.315 -0.282 -0.234
(0.296) (0.285) (0.268)
shock-pests on crops -0.237 -0.275 -0.219
(0.300) (0.294) (0.281)
shock-crop failure -0.343∗ -0.242 -0.139
(0.181) (0.175) (0.163)
shock-pests on storage 0.956∗∗ 0.885∗∗ 0.570∗
(0.372) (0.359) (0.334)
shock-pests on livestock 1.140∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.220) (0.208)
z raw math 0.448∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(0.0851) (0.0845)
Years of educational aspirations by caregiver 0.371∗∗∗
(0.0786)
Constant 13.63∗∗∗ 13.71∗∗∗ 13.84∗∗∗ 13.96∗∗∗ 9.055∗∗∗
(0.413) (0.441) (0.437) (0.406) (1.155)
Observations 765 764 764 756 749
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at child level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix B Checking for balance after matching
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